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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper employs a unique data set to evaluate existing methodologies that have
been used to estimate the e¤ects of intra-rm job segregation on the gender wage gap.
Our paper extends existing methodology to better measure the degree of hierarchical
discrimination and its impact on wages. We examine problems that arise from using
conventional approaches to wage determination and decomposition. Our approach
entails a formal derivation of wage - level decompositions under an alternative model
of wage determination.
The vehicle for this evaluation is an examination of occupational segregation that
took place within a single rm that faced allegations of gender discrimination in job
assignments and promotion. It was alleged that women at this rm were deliberately
excluded from higher-paying managerial positions and were thus concentrated in the
lower-paying job titles. This practice, known as hierarchical segregation, is a more
subtle form of discrimination because favoritism towards one gender is harder to
substantiate if both men and women are paid equally within job titles.
This di¤ers from the traditional view of occupational segregation, where women are
crowded into what are considered female professions such as nursing and consequently
depress wages in these occupations. Our evaluation is assisted by a priori knowledge
of the wage structure within the rm, an advantage that is absent from most empirical
analyses of wage determination and gender wage gaps. We validate the application of
the alternative methodology using CPS data to provide information that generalizes
beyond what we know from our sample rm.
While there have been several studies that provide an empirical explanation regard-
ing the e¤ects of segregation on the gender wage gap, e.g. Bayard, Hellerstein, Neu-
mark, and Troske (2003), Bergman (1989), Malkiel and Malkiel (1973), and Sorenson
(1989, 1990), due to a scarcity of rm-level data, relatively few studies have econo-
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metrically explored intra-rm segregation as a mechanism. Most researchers that do
have access to rm-level data use the standard hedonic Mincer human capital wage
model and the Oaxaca decomposition to measure the factors that contribute to the
gender wage gap by including experience, experience-squared, and job title indica-
tors. The inclusion of job title indicators is problematic because typically there are
some occupations with no men and others with no women. This issue of empty cells
leads to signicant problems in the comparability of standard wage regressions and
the gender wage decompositions that rely upon them. Beyond the analysis of any
particular rms wage structure, we observe that in unionized rms the rules for wage
setting typically require that individuals in the same job title and seniority step be
paid the same wage. In such a setting the standard practices, which do not take
these factors into account, lead to misspecication and misinterpretation of the rela-
tionship between wages and other factors. Therefore, we utilize insider information
about our rms wage structure to determine the direction of the bias that results
from conventional approaches and propose an alternative strategy. We then examine
the results obtained from the alternative decomposition under the assumption of no
insider knowledge to determine the magnitudes of di¤erences in the segregation e¤ect
and other factors.
We take a particular interest in empirically examining and extending the methodol-
ogy set forth in Baldwin, Butler, and Johnson (2001), henceforth, BBJ. Their model
of hierarchical segregation assumes men have a distaste for female supervision where
discrimination arises due to men being di¤erentially promoted into higher paying
managerial job titles. In comparison with the conventional approach to modeling job
segregation by examining discrete job classications, BBJs methodology treats the
job hierarchy as a continuum. Di¤erences in wages imply a di¤erent position in the
hierarchy. This feature is useful even when considering changes in seniority within
a particular job title in addition to moving up the job ladder. We extend the BBJ
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methodology to accommodate nonlinearities from the assumed wage distribution and
include an interaction term that frees the segregation e¤ect from being dependent on
factors that contribute to wage discrimination.
We employ data from a regional supermarket that faced a Title VII class-action
lawsuit for not providing equal promotion opportunities for its female employees. The
wage setting process for our sample rm is fairly representative for a wide variety of
rms that faced a class-action lawsuit in the mid 1980s over gender discrimination.
The rm was accused of discriminating by not promoting females into managerial
positions and by paying female workers lower wages through job title assignments.
The hierarchical wage structure of the rm is set by gender-neutral union contracts
for hourly wage workers such that overt wage discrimination within unionized job
titles is nonexistent. Within each job title wage rates are set according to a seniority
step function. The advantage of knowing the true wage structure is that it allows
us to independently verify how standard wage specications coupled with a model of
hierarchical segregation might perform in wage decompositions that seek to measure
the contributions of endowments, pure wage discrimination, and job segregation.
This class action lawsuit is relevant to more recent discrimination cases such as
the ongoing lawsuits against Wal-Mart and Costco in which these companies stand
accused of preferential treatment towards men.1 Both rms are accused of advanc-
ing male employees more quickly than female employees, denying female employees
equal job assignment and promotions, and failing to consider females for promotion
even after considering similar criteria for males. BBJ provides a means of analyzing
intra-rm segregation in this context by developing a model in which discrimination
depends more on the positions of males and females in the job hierarchy rather than
1In 2011 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the cases against Wal-Mart and Costco could not
go forward as class action lawsuits. Subsequently, more narrowly focused cases against the two
retailers have been led in state courts.
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a reluctance to work together. Their model assumes that men exhibit distaste for
female supervision and derives a sorting function related to wages that predicts the
occupational distribution of men and women across job titles. The BBJ approach
imposes strong distributional restrictions and its theoretical predictions cannot be
adequately tested with CENSUS/CPS type data. We not only utilize our rm sam-
ple to evaluate the model, but we also employ a subset of the March 2011 CPS data to
provide information with respect to the bias that results from using a standard wage
specication in the absence of knowledge of the true wage structure. This exercises
exhibits the generalizability of the knowledge gained from the single rm case.
We test the restrictions of the BBJ model derived from the lognormal and gamma
wage distributions and examine the robustness of the BBJ methodology in a setting
in which the true wage structure and the outcome of the court case are known. We
believe that our regional grocery store chain data are better suited to the task of
evaluating the model than industry level data or other rm-level data for several
reasons. First, the weakness of using industry level data is that aggregation occurs
across hetergeneous employers, wage structures, and job ladders, and the results are
not as robust when looking across multiple employers as opposed to a single entity.
Second, in any wage decomposition there exists ambiguity over whether segregation is
due to voluntary choices stemming from equal constraints or because one group faces
discriminatory constraints in the labor market. Given that the case was settled in
the womens favor, we resolve this identication issue by assuming that job position-
ing for some of the women at the rm was discriminatory and involuntary.2 Lastly,
2Some may argue that not all women in the rm would be willing to take on the extra respon-
sibility of the managerial positions even if they were ofered the title, especially those women who
cannot commit extra time to the rm because of child-raising responsibilities. However the case
was a class-action lawsuit stemming from multiple allegations, and the court eventually ruled that
enough women sought these positions and the rm consistently denied women the opportunity to
move up the job ladder. Thus, we accept that occupational segregation in this rm stemmed mainly
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there is a fundamental wage decomposition problem in estimating the e¤ects of gen-
der di¤erences in the returns to occupational a¢ liation with respect to the left out
reference group (Jones (1983)), Oaxaca and Ransom (1999), Gardeazabal and Ugidos
(2004), Gelbach (working paper) and Yun (2005)). While the overall estimated segre-
gation e¤ect is invariant to the choice of the left out occupational dummy variable in
the wage decomposition, the contribution of gender di¤erences in occupational wage
returns to the gender wage gap is not. We are able to avoid this specic problem
using BBJs approach because one dispenses with the need to specify occupational
categories ex-ante since each wage corresponds to a di¤erent job position.
The objective of our study is to analyze the sensitivity of the results to commonly
used wage distributions and test the restrictions placed on the model to determine:
(1) if BBJs approach accurately models the hierarchical discrimination observed in
our data set, (2) explore how standard wage specications imbedded in a model of
hierarchical segregation might perform in wage decompositions that seek to measure
the contributions of endowments, pure wage discrimination, and segregation, and
(3) in the process, extend the implementation of log wage decompositions in the
hierarchical segregation framework to examine wage-level di¤erences between men
and women. As a practical matter we accept the necessity for the participants in
discrimination lawsuits to understand the magnitude of the wage gaps in terms of the
actual dollar units. When implementing decompositions in wage-levels it is important
to note that the di¤erence in sample average wages do not generally correspond to the
di¤erence in the average of conditional wages. Thus we account for the nonlinearity
that arises from the assumed wage distribution and include an interaction term that
frees the segregation term in the wage decomposition from dependence on the factors
that contribute to wage discrimination. Finally (4) we perform the same exercise using
from discriminatory practices and therefore could be expected to largely contribute to the gender
wage gap.
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CPS data to provide generalizable results with respect to hierarchical discrimination.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the previous
literature and criticisms. Section 3 describes our extension of the BBJ methodology
and model used for estimation including the derivation of wage-level decompositions
in the hierarchical segregation framework and an alternative estimation strategy when
encountering convergence issues. Section 4 describes the sample from the grocery store
data including summary statistics and preliminary regression results that provide
evidence of hierarchical segregation. Section 5 provides empirical results obtained
using our extension of the BBJ decomposition in the case of an assumed lognormal
wage distribution. We then analyze the advantages of extending the hierarchical
segregation model vis-à-vis conventional wage-level decompositions that include job
title indicators. Section 6 concludes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Hierarchical discrimination or intra-rm segregation closely follows the literature on
occupational crowding (Bergman (1989) and Sorensen (1989, 1990)). The traditional
theory of occupational crowding assumes that womens job choices are limited to
positions that society deems feminine. Thus, women tend to be concentrated in
low paying jobs and men are concentrated in high paying jobs. Employers reserve
certain positions for men, decreasing the demand for women in non-female dominated
occupations. As a result the supply of women increases in occupations considered
womens work exerting downward pressure on equilibrium wages, where women
become undervalued in the labor market. Bayard, Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske
(2003) compliment previous studies on occupational segregation by analyzing a data-
set that provides a more nationally representative assessment of the mechanisms
a¤ecting the gender wage gap. Their methodology is very similar to Johnson and
Solon (1986), Sorensen (1989), and Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) and nd that
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womens wages decrease in industries and establishments that have higher proportions
of females.
There are few studies that examine intra-rm segregation and even fewer that test
econometric models of hierarchical discrimination. Malkiel and Malkiel (1973) is
one of the rst studies that uses rm level data from a professional organization
to examine how job level assignment a¤ects the gender wage gap. Malkiel and
Malkiel run simple ordinary least squares wage regressions controlling for individual
characteristics, actual experience, education, and job level. Their ndings, similar to
Ransom and Oaxaca (2005), indicate that job level explains most of the variation in
wages among men and women. However, the Malkiel and Malkiel study was unable
to distinguish between whether women chose to invest in less human capital, resulting
in the rm assigning women to lower job levels, or whether the rm was participating
in discriminatory practices. They were able to state that the rm compensated men
and women equally within each job level. Unfortunately, men and women with the
same characteristics did not necessarily receive the same salary since women were
generally assigned to the lower salaried positions.
BBJs rm level theory of hierarchical discrimination is based on the evolution of
gender specic occupational structures that have developed over the years (Bergman
(1986, 1989), Blau and Ferber (1991), Costa (2000), Fuchs (1988), Goldin (1990), and
Macpherson and Hirsch (1995)). Before 1950, these occupational structures were not
developed with the intention of accommodating females in higher managerial posi-
tions, since it was assumed that women would leave the labor market upon marriage.
Polachek (1981, 1987) o¤ers a human capital explanation for gender di¤erences in
occupational distributions that appeals to the atrophy e¤ects of anticipated inter-
mittent labor force participation. It has been shown that women who anticipate
spells of absences from the labor force choose jobs with lower returns. However, Blau
and Ferbers (1991) study nds that while professional women expect similar starting
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salaries, they anticipate lower earnings than their male counterparts over the course of
their working lives even after controlling for time spent out of the labor market. Be-
cause occupational structures have not evolved as fast as the perception of workplace
equality between males and females, BBJ hypothesizes that males exhibit distaste for
female supervision. In order to compensate for this distaste, males require a wage
premium, thus a cost minimizing rm will promote a male candidate over a female
candidate or hire solely all women. Consequently, a possible reason why a gender
wage gap still exists is because women are not promoted as quickly as men or because
women are held to higher promotional standards (Blau and Ferber (1991), Malkiel
and Malkiel (1973), and Olson and Becker (1983)).
BBJ decomposes hierarchical discriminations inuence on mean female wages into
an occupational e¤ect and a wage e¤ect, where female wages are reduced in order to
compensate for the discriminatory employment costs.3 They evaluate their model
using the 1988 Current Population Survey (CPS) sample of workers in the insurance
industry, and estimate the e¤ects of hierarchical discrimination on occupational po-
sitioning and wages. However they were not able to evaluate all the predictions
of the model because they did not have access to rm level data with appropriate
occupational hierarchies. This shortcoming of the data only allowed them to verify
that the data were consistent with the hypothesis that the relative number of females
declines exponentially as one moves up the job ladder.
3In the case of our regional grocery store chain, all hourly wage-workers were paid the same union
scale regardless of gender. Consequently, it is not possible for males to receive a wage premium had
the rm chosen to promote women instead. Interestingly enough, we still do not observe women
in higher supervisory positions even among the hourly wage-workers. Union contracts enhance
segregation because the employer is restricted from compensating males for hiring female managers.
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3. MODEL
In this paper we extend the BBJ decomposition to account for non-linearities that
arise from the assumed wage distribution as well as include an interaction term that
frees the segregation component from being dependent on the factors that contribute
to wage discrimination. The BBJ model is motivated by the hypothesis that labor
market discrimination against women depends more on the positions of men and
women in the job hierarchies as opposed to a desire to avoid working in proximity
to one another. Thus, the contribution of their paper is that they are able to
identify a segregation term without having to choose ex-ante the number or level of
occupational titles. In the empirical implementation, the job titles are considered to
be a continuous function of wages in that each wage represents a di¤erent position
in the hierarchy. When job titles are viewed in this way, one might consider that
men have a distaste or resentment from being in a subordinate wage position. The
discriminatory pattern is such that even if wages are equalized across the sexes by job
title, females are only promoted along the job ladder if their responsibility is limited to
exclusively supervising women. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that hierarchical
discrimination reduces the proportion of females relative to the proportion of male
workers as one moves up the job ladder. Specically, BBJ predicts a sorting function
with an exponential decline in the relative proportions of female to male workers as
one moves up the management hierarchy.4 However, we will de-emphasize the role of
the exponentially declining sorting function because BBJs methodology only requires
that the sorting function be a negative function of wages. In particular, the form of
4This is based on simulating bivariate normally distributed investment costs (investment in skill
or ability for the worker to become a supervisor or manager). The equilibria are computed for three
specications for both the Leontief and Cobb-Douglas technologies using a grid search method.
For all technologies, they reject the alternative of a random distribution of women across the job
hierarchy. Their simulation results nd the rate of exponential decline to be 0.6.
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the sorting function, g(w), will depend on the distributional assumptions placed on
male wages. Consequently, the derivation of the sorting function is simplied when
assuming a wage distribution from the exponential family.
There are two candidates from the exponential family that are commonly used to
model wage distributions; the lognormal and the gamma. Although BBJ conned
their empirical analysis to the gamma wage distribution, our analysis will be conned
to the lognormal distribution because it is the most common wage distribution in the
labor economics literature.5 We rst derive the conventional decomposition using the
standard Mincer wage specication with discrete job titles. Then we briey review
the BBJ methodology using the lognormal distribution and nally proceed with our
variation of the decomposition for the lognormal wage distribution.
3.1 Conventional Decomposition
One objective of this paper is to compare the conventional decomposition that
controls for discrete job titles or occupations to an alternative methodology that treats
job titles as a continum of wages. In the conventional decomposition, typically, the
male and female wage regressions are estimated separately:
`n (wmi) = xmim + Jomiom + Jmim + "mi; (1)
`n (wfi) = xfif + Jofiof + Jfif + "fi (2)
where Jo is a vector of job title dummy variables in which males and females overlap,
Jm and Jf are gender segregated job title dummy variables for all-male and all-
female job titles, the 0s are the corresponding vectors of job title coe¢ cients, and "j
 N(0; 2j); j = 1; 2.
5See Appendix for our analysis using the gamma wage distribution.
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Standard practice with the semi-log model is for the wage decomposition to be
calculated in terms of log wages. The conventional log wage decomposition may be
expressed by
`n(wm)  `n(wf ) =
h























Jm^m   Jf ^f
i
:
Unfortunately, the presence of non-overlapping job title distributions confounds any
attempt at identifying the pure discrimination, job segregation, endowment, and in-
teraction components of the log wage decomposition. For example the rst term in
brackets on the RHS of eq.(3) cannot unambiguously be identied as the endow-
ment e¤ect because of the arbitrariness of attempting to further decompose the last
term in brackets, i.e.
h
Jm^m   Jf ^f
i





^om cannot be interpreted unambiguously as the e¤ect of oc-
cupational segregation. While the decomposition terms are simplied somewhat in
the case in which pure wage discrimination is absent, the fundamental problem of
non-overlapping job title distributions remains:






Jm^m   Jf ^f
i
: (4)
One could subtract the term
h
Jm^m   Jf ^f
i
from both sides of the decompositions
given by (3) and (4). Alternatively, one could limit the estimation and decomposition
to the sub sample of workers for whom the occupational distributions overlap. Neither
of these alternatives is particularly attractive. While our focus here is on wage levels,
converting to a wage level decomposition from the conventional log wage model will
not change the fundamental problem of non-overlapping job title distributions.
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3.2 Hierarchical Model-Lognormal Distribution
In order to identify the e¤ect of segregation on the gender wage gap, one rst
assumes a wage distribution for males. With homogenous workers, pure wage dis-
crimination is manifest by the female wage within job titles appearing as a constant
fraction of the corresponding male wage. We start by specifying the male wage den-
sity fm(wh) corresponding to the log normal distribution where each wage represents











Restricting the parameters of the wage distribution for females to be proportional to
the parameters of the wage distribution for males implies that the wage density for
females will come from the same class of distributions as the male wage density. This
in turn implies that if the female wage distribution is a conjugate form of the male
wage distribution, then the returns on occupational a¢ liation will be proportional
to those of the males. The constant of proportionality is the segregation term, .
Thus, given a parametric wage distribution, the sorting function (which determines
the occupational distribution of females relative to males) will decline in a monotonic
transformation of the wage. Equation (6) shows that if wages are lognormal, then
the sorting function will exhibit an exponential decline only because the lognormal is
a member of the exponential family:













9>>=>>; ;  > 1: (6)
The female wage distribution depends on the discriminatory sorting function and























It is evident that hierarchical segregation in this model implies lower wage dispersion
for females. Notice that as  approaches 1 in the limit, occupational segregation
vanishes and the female wage distribution converges to the male wage distribution.6
In the homogeneous worker case BBJ obtain the coe¢ cients of interest by jointly
estimating the male and female wage likelihood functions. The mean log wage di¤er-
ence is then decomposed into occupational segregation e¤ects and within-occupational
wage di¤erences (discrimination). This methodology dispenses with the need to
specify ex ante the number of occupational titles because each wage rate represents
a di¤erent occupation. Thus, in equations (6), (7), w not only represents a di¤erent
wage, but also a wage corresponding to a particular job title. This is an alterna-
tive method to the original decomposition proposed by Oaxaca (1973) because the
assumption of a continuum of occupational categories with a specic wage density
function avoids issues in estimating the e¤ects of gender di¤erences in the returns
to occupational a¢ liation with an arbitrary left out reference group (Jones (1983),
Oaxaca and Ransom (1999), Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2004), and Yun (2005)).
A problem with the Oaxaca decomposition in its original form is that ambiguity ex-
ists over whether between-group di¤erences in occupational distributions can be inter-
preted as discriminatory e¤ects of occupational segregation or as non-discriminatory
di¤erences in labor supply choices. This issue is avoided when BBJ integrate the
occupational sorting function into the joint likelihood function. The segregation pa-
rameter is identied and is used to estimate the e¤ect of hierarchical discrimination.
6From the functional form of the sorting function as given in BBJ one can easily verify that the
female wage distribution derived from the sorting function is a proper density function.
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Additionally, the case for interpreting job positioning as discriminatory and involun-
tary in our data is based on the fact that the women brought suit and the class-action
lawsuit was settled in the womens favor. In section 4, we will discuss the data and
its origins in more detail.
As alluded to above, within the BBJ framework two cases arise in the treatment of
the gender wage decomposition. The rst is a special case in which it is assumed that
wages within each job title are xed and workers are homogenous. Since there are no
di¤erences in characteristics other than sex, and wages are equalized within each job
category, the human capital and wage discrimination e¤ects are eliminated and the
decomposition reduces to a segregation term. Thus, the decomposition attributes all
di¤erences in wages to occupational segregation. The expected log wage di¤erence
between males and females is given by






where E [`n(wm)] = m =  is the expected log wage for males and  is the segregation
coe¢ cient. It is easily veried that the expected log wage for females is given by






: In terms of variances we have var [`n(wm)] = 2m = 
2

















: In this simple case, the most e¢ cient estimation would be joint
estimation of the parameters ; ; and  by MLE.
Partly for reasons of comparability across di¤erent classes of wage distributions, our
interest in this paper focuses on decompositions of wage levels. With the assumption















: Accordingly, the decomposition in this special case can be expressed
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as















It is important to recognize that the decomposition described by (9) in general
does not correspond to the di¤erence in the sample average of individual conditional
mean wages. Consequently, we further extend the BBJ decomposition to account for
the non-linear nature of the lognormal distribution (Oaxaca and Ransom (2003) and
Sarnikar, Sorensen, and Oaxaca (2007)). In order to operationalize the decomposi-
tion, we replace the parameters by their MLEs:
wm = exp











where bm and bf are remainder terms that equate the means of the predicted wages
for males and females to their sample means, i.e.
bm = `n(wm)  (^+ 0:5^2) (10)







The empirical analog of the wage decomposition in (9) is given by























exp(bm)  exp(bf )i :
The rst term in (12) is an estimate of the gender wage gap attributable to segrega-
tion, and the second term captures the sample mean wage di¤erence due to gender
di¤erences in the deviation between sample mean wages and predicted mean wages.
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The second case considered by BBJ introduces worker heterogeneity and allows
wages to vary within each job title according to personal characteristics. The density




























Conditioning on worker characteristics (x) introduces additional parameters (),
where m = xmm, f = xf







With worker heterogeneity the presence of wage discrimination implies that female
wage rates within each job title are a fraction () of the wage rates the females would
face if their characteristics were valued at the male returns:
 = exp [(xf ) (f   m)] ; (15)
or in terms of logs we have the familiar wage discrimination coe¢ cient:
`n() =  xf (m   f ) = xf (f   m) : (16)
Clearly in the absence of wage discrimination, m   f = 0 )  = 1.
The female wage density (14) implies









If we substitute xff = xfm + `n() obtained from (16) into (17), worker hetero-
geneity, wage discrimination, and segregation imply







With worker heterogeneity and conditioning on sample mean characteristics (x),
the expected (conditional) log wage decomposition can be written as






The rst two terms in (19) correspond to the Oaxaca decomposition where the wage
di¤erence is attributed to di¤erences in individual characteristics and di¤erences at-
tributed to discrimination. The last term corresponds to the log wage di¤erence
attributed to occupational segregation.
Given that the male wage structure is the nondiscriminatory norm, an issue that
could be raised with decomposition (19) is that the discrimination term xf (m f )






depends both on the female sample characteristics and the e¤ects
of wage discrimination for f 6= m : This issue is an example of the problem of
constructing counterfactuals when there is not complete overlap in the distributions of
characteristics for two populations being compared. One way to address this concern
is to employ a standard approach in decompositions that introduces an interaction
term between coe¢ cient and characteristics di¤erences. Extending this approach to
the BBJ decomposition yields the following decomposition:





  [(xm   xf ) (m   f )













are freed of their dependence on the characteristics of the female sample and on wage
discrimination, respectively. Sorting out the decomposition in this manner generates
an interaction term  







of the interactions between endowment di¤erences, discrimination, and segregation.
In the case of wage level decompositions, the situation is a bit more complicated.
For simplicity we condition on the true parameter values to obtain the expected
wage gap between a representative male and a representative female at the respective
sample mean characteristics:















After some algebraic manipulation we extend the BBJ model to obtain a wage de-
composition for this case:

































[expxfm   2exp (xmm)













where the rst three terms in (21) correspond to the e¤ects of the wage gap attributed
to individual characteristics, wage discrimination, and segregation, respectively. The
7This segregation measure corresponds exactly to the measure used in BBJ (2001, p.104) for the
lognormal distribution.
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fourth term measures the interactions between di¤erences in characteristics, discrim-
ination, and segregation.
Since the decomposition described by (21) is evaluated at the sample mean char-
acteristics, we again have to take account of the fact that wage level decompositions
based on the log normal do not in general correspond to the di¤erence in the average
of individual conditional mean wages. Moreover, the true parameter values have to
be replaced with estimates. Consequently, our extension of the BBJ decomposition
in this case begins with expressions for estimated means of the wage decomposition

































































where bm and bf are remainder terms that equate the means of the predicted wages
for males and females to their sample means, i.e.





















The full decomposition of observed sample mean wages can be expressed as
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The rst three terms in (24) are respectively the empirical estimates of the gender
wage gap attributable to individual characteristics, wage discrimination, and segre-
gation. The fourth term captures the sample mean wage di¤erence due to gender
di¤erences in the deviation between sample mean wages and predicted mean wages,
while the fth term residually reects the interaction e¤ects between characteristics,
discrimination, segregation, and di¤erences in actual and predicted sample means.
With the exception of the residual term, all of the decomposition terms are con-
structed with reference to the male sample. In the absence of wage discrimination,
wm = wmf and the decomposition simplies somewhat:


















Our treatment of the log normal version of the BBJ hierarchical segregation model
reveals that an important di¤erence between the hierarchical model and the conven-
tional approach to wage level decomposition is that the former does not explicitly
control for job titles. Rather, the hierarchical model identies the e¤ects of job
segregation through a parameter () estimated on the basis of treating the job hi-
erarchy as a continuum in wage rates. By the same token the conventional wage
level decomposition has di¢ culty in identifying the wage gap e¤ects of job title seg-
regation. Furthermore, the BBJ approach nesses the problem of non-overlapping
occupational/job title distributions between men and women by treating job titles as
a continuum. In the case of the conventional model, the decompositions shown in
22
(3) and (4) are ambiguous in the presence of the empty cell problem that arises when
the occupational categories in Jom and Jof are not identical.
4. DATA
The data used for our analysis come from a Title VII class action lawsuit brought
against a large grocery retailer that faced the same allegations of discriminatory em-
ployment practices as Wal-Mart and Costco face today. The rm was found guilty of
discrimination in 1984, and negotiated a settlement that required payment of back
payas well as the implementation of a¢ rmative action policies for promotion and
job assignment. The data span the years 1978-1986. Although the a¢ rmative ac-
tion policies were not implemented prior to the year-end of 1986, Ransom and Oaxaca
(2005) nd evidence that the employer was already taking remedial action after the
ling of the lawsuit in 1982. Within this time frame we are able to observe the
changes in the distribution of male and female job assignments and promotion for
retail workers only, as we do not have data for non-retail workers such as accoun-
tants, truck drivers, and janitors. Further information on the data set including
characteristics of the rm and details on the union contracts can be found in Ransom
and Oaxaca (2005).
This data set can be used to evaluate the Hierarchical Theory of discrimination
because it meets the criteria set forth in BBJ: a single employer with a relatively
homogeneous group of employees who vary in pay, job titles, and seniority within the
rm. Each store in the chain had sixteen job titles, ve of which were management
level. Examining the raw data provides preliminary evidence that although the union
contracts were gender neutral, a large wage di¤erential arose because of occupational
segregation. Women received di¤erent job assignments than men with similar charac-
teristics. Most of the following details on the data, relevant to this research question,
are reproduced from the data section in Ransom and Oaxaca (2005).
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The majority of the employees received hourly wages and worked as food clerks,
whereas those in the higher managerial levels received a set salary. Among the
hourly wage workers, union contracts guaranteed that wage di¤erences were non-
existent within job titles among men and women with the same seniority; however,
the employer had full control over job allocation and whom to hire. The contract
only required that the most senior employee be considered for a higher position.8
Di¤erences within a particular position reect di¤erences in seniority, however an
individual with high seniority as a food clerk will not receive a higher wage than a
manager with a similar seniority level.
The hierarchical structure of the rm is reproduced from Ransom and Oaxaca
(2005) in Figure 1. There were four departments in each store: meat, produce,
grocery, and variety (non-foods). In addition to the three salaried management
positions of Store Manager, Assistant Manager, and Relief Manager, within the meat
and produce departments the non-salaried management positions of Meat Manager
and Produce Manager were available. The night crew chief supervised stocking of
the store during the night for which they received a wage premium and is considered
a non-salaried management position.
For the purposes of this study, we chose the year 1981 to evaluate the hierarchical
model. The year 1981 was selected because it was prior to the lawsuit, thus the ling
of the lawsuit had not yet inuenced the behavior of the rm. Summary statistics as
of December 1981 for each job title are provided in Table 1. Our data set comprises
786 female and 1,182 male retail employees. These are individuals who were present
as of 1981 and had positive earnings. Average characteristics of workers such as age
and seniority are included as well as hourly wages for non-salaried workers. Average
annual earnings include bonuses paid to managerial employees, and are measured for
8For more information on the specics of the labor union contracts see Ransom and Oaxaca
(2005).
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the end of 1981. The raw numbers show that courtesy clerks earned signicantly less
than any other position. The high turnover rate for courtesy clerks is also apparent,
as they were relatively younger than other employees assigned to other positions and
their average seniority was a little less than a year. Interestingly, the average hourly
female worker was paid relatively close to or higher than the average hourly male
worker in a number of job titles, reecting the higher average seniority of women
within these job titles. Thus a natural question to ask is: why were the average
earnings for females less than the average earnings for males? A plausible answer is
that women may have been working fewer hours. Part of the lawsuit claims that
women were consistently denied the opportunity to work longer hours.9
The distribution of men and women across job titles was relatively segregated.
Most employees in the store worked as food clerks, a job which required little previous
skill or education and was predominately lled by females. The distribution of the
store-level and department management positions was disproportionately male. Prior
to the ling of the lawsuit, the rm had never employed a female in the store manager
position, as seen in Table 2 which describes the distribution of men and women
across the job hierarchy as of 1981. The hierarchical categories reported in the table
correspond to the wage hierarchies within the rm. Only 0.38 percent of women
were in the second, third, and fourth highest occupational rungs. This is particularly
interesting because there were no females holding the title of produce manager or meat
manager, and 48 men were holding the night manager position compared to 3 women.
Women are found to be disproportionately represented in the lowest occupational
titles compared to men, and 80 percent of women were found in the second lowest
9Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) indicate that the percentage of part-time to full-time employees grew
at roughly the same rate for males and females, though the distribution was consistently unequal,
with 86 percent of women compared to 69 percent of men being part-time employees at the end of
the period.
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rung. The last column in Table 2 reports the ratio of the fraction of women in each
occupational grouping to the fraction of men. Consistent with BBJ expectations,
the ratio declines as one moves up the occupational hierarchy. This table alone
dramatically reveals the hierarchical character of employment segmentation within
the rm.
It is instructive to examine regressions of the logarithm of hourly wages on age,
seniority, and job title dummies. Because store manager, assistant manager, and
relief manager are salaried, non-union positions, we create an hourly wage variable
that is intended to capture the wage di¤erences associated with being assigned to
one of the three highest positions.10 The hourly wage for the salaried positions is
imputed by assuming that the hourly wage for the lowest salaried position is the
same as the highest hourly wage for the hourly wage earners. Thus WIII is dened
as the hourly wage for relief managers. The hourly wage for the assistant manager,
WII , is dened as WII =
EII
EIII
WIII , where EII and EIII are the annual earnings
for assistant manager and relief manager respectively. Finally, the hourly wage for
store manager is dened as WI =
EI
EIII
WIII , where EI is the annual earnings for
the store manager position. This insures that we preserve the ranking of wages to
positions, implying the hourly wage for store manager is greater than the hourly wage
for assistant manager, and in turn larger than the relief mangers hourly wage. While
the salaries for the three highest management positions were not based on a union
scale, we assume on average that hourly wages in these positions are proportional to
each other.
10We have estimated similar regressions using log earnings rather than our imputed hourly wage;
however the results are not as informative since annual earnings do not accurately control for di¤er-
ences in hours worked. We have these results upon request. Unfortunately, we do not have access to
actual hours worked. It is plausible that women in this rm were earning less than men on average
because they were not working as many hours, ceteris paribus, but we do know from the lawsuit
that women sought to work longer hours and were denied them.
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Results presented in Table 3 provide preliminary evidence that occupational seg-
regation plays a major role in wage determination within the rm. Specication
I shows that womens hourly earnings were 4.4 percent less than men on average.
This di¤erence in earnings can be attributed to di¤erences in promotion to higher
positions or into full-time positions. It is important to note that it is possible that
total earnings may include extra-curricular activities at the rm, such as overtime
or bonuses, which may contribute to higher hourly earnings di¤erences between men
and women, especially if they were more likely to be o¤ered to males. Unfortunately,
the data we observe for hourly wage workers are the straight-time hourly wages.
Specication II shows that after controlling for human capital di¤erences in senior-
ity and age, the wage gap increases from 4.4 percent to 13.4 percent. Furthermore,
in specication III we control for job assignment by including indicators for the job
title of the employee. Once we allow for di¤erent job assignments, the gender wage
gap decreases to about 6.7 percent. Interestingly, only including job titles in the
regression, shown in specication IV, results in a wage gap of approximately 2 per-
cent. About 83 percent of the variation in earnings can be attributed to job title
alone. Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) run a similar regression for non-management
hourly wage workers using the logarithm of hourly wages as a dependent variable and
nd that 95 percent of the variation in wages is attributed to occupational title for
the wage workers. Thus, gender di¤erences in pay can mostly be explained by job
assignment or rm level segregation.11
11We lack information on the number of hours salaried employees worked. We replicate the
regressions using the logarithm of wages presented in Table 5 in Ransom and Oaxaca (2005) with
the 1981 data and nd the same results: womens wages were higher than men on average. This
di¤erence reects the higher seniority and age of women. However, after controlling for di¤erences
in seniority and age, womens wages were actually less than men. Furthermore, once occupational
controls are included, over 90 percent of the variation in wages could be explained by job title alone
(job titles excluded salaried positions).
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5. MODEL RESULTS
This section provides the MLE results corresponding to the hierarchical model.
We begin by examining the case where workers are homogenous and then allow for
wages to vary within each job title by introducing worker heterogeneity. Recall that
the union contracts did specify seniority gradients within a particular job title and
required that the most senior employee be considered for a higher position. Thus,
we include age, age squared, seniority, and seniority squared and estimate the model
via maximum likelihood.
In the absence of specic information about the wage setting process within rms,
the Mincerian quadratic in age and tenure specication is commonly used in both
market and rm level settings. Age might reect general or pre-rm work experience
and seniority captures rm specic experience. In reality there are seniority wage
caps within rms and specic job titles. Our rm is no exception. Therefore, we
are in a unique position to evaluate the standard specication in a setting in which
the wage structure is known for the unionized workers, though not for managerial
workers.
Given that our rm employed gender neutral union contracts, we only report the
coe¢ cients from the restricted model in the absence of pure wage discrimination.
Accordingly, this restriction on the models parameters eliminates the (wage) dis-
crimination component from the wage decomposition. Below we compare the con-
ventional decomposition results to those obtained from the hierarchical decomposition
and thereby test the restrictions imposed by the BBJ model. Furthermore, we apply
the hierarchical model to the March 2011 CPS data in an e¤ort to generalize the
potential bias that may occur in the absence of knowledge of the wage structure.
28
5.1 Decompositions
We begin the analysis by assuming worker homogeneity and the absence of pure
wage discrimination. The BBJ inspired gender wage decomposition assuming worker
homogeneity entails estimating the lognormal distribution for males and females
jointly via MLE. This specication appears reasonable given that our sample is rela-
tively homogenous and that the union contracts guaranteed the same starting wage
regardless of gender. The coe¢ cient estimates as well as the decomposition results
associated with equation (12) are reported in Table 4. Our ndings indicate that
the distribution of males and females is not equalized across job titles given that the
coe¢ cient of segregation, , is greater than 1. We can easily reject the hypothesis
that   1 against the alternative  > 1. The theoretical implications of this de-
composition imply that any di¤erence in mean earnings will be entirely attributed
to occupational segregation. In our case, most of the di¤erence will be attributed
to hierarchical segregation as we adjust for di¤erences between the conditional mean
and sample mean. The decomposition results indicate that 70.8 cents of the 63.3
cent gender wage gap is due to segregation and the remaining -4.5 cents equates the
sample means to the predicted conditional means.
While the homogeneity assumption appears reasonable, we know that the union
contracts specied that employees with higher seniority be paid a wage premium
within a particular job title and required that the most senior employee be considered
for openings in higher positions. Thus, we move to an alternate specication that
allows wages to vary within job titles by incorporating age, age-squared, seniority,
and seniority-squared into the likelihood function.
The classic Mincer human capital wage model specication generally yields very
plausible results for heterogenous data and is standard in the labor literature when
the institutional details of the rms wage setting process are unknown. However,
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we are in a unique position where we actually know the wage structure of the rm.
Hourly wages for workers within each job title are set according to a gender neutral
union wage scale and therefore any within job title wage variation is entirely due to
di¤erences in seniority. In fact the wage structure for our rm can be described by
seniority step functions within each job title for the hourly wage positions. In this
setting, overt wage discrimination within job titles is nonexistent. Theoretically, the
entire wage gap should be attributed to some combination of human capital di¤erences
and hierarchical segregation. Although the Mincer specication does not literally
correspond to the union wage scale faced by our rm, we adopt this specication
as an approximation and examine its properties in a specic institutional setting in
which it is assumed that the researcher at least knows that pure wage discrimination
is absent. Accordingly, in the likelihood function we constrain the returns on seniority
and on age to be the same for men and women.12 The decomposition results in the
absence of a pure wage discrimination component are calculated according to equation
(25).
The coe¢ cient estimates and the decomposition results for the heterogeneous case
in the absence of pure wage discrimination are reported in Table 5. As in the homoge-
nous case,  (the coe¢ cient of segregation) exceeds 1. Again we can easily reject the
hypothesis that   1 against the alternative  > 1; which establishes that gender
segregation exists within the rm and disadvantages women. Not surprisingly, the
highest percentage of the gender wage gap is attributed to hierarchical segregation,
where 1.40 dollars of the 66 cent wage gap is due to women being excluded from
12The payroll data provides an opportunity not unlike a natural experiment where we can compare
the decomposition results obtained assuming that the wage structure of the rm is unknown to the
decomposition results where we utilize insider knowledge. This will shed light on the specication
biases that can arise when the institutional details are unknown, which is unfortunately the case for
most researchers.
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higher paying job titles. Recall that the rm was advised to promote employees with
higher seniority into the salaried managerial positions. While women had higher
seniority on average, the rm never employed a female store manager prior to the
lawsuit. This is established in the decomposition, where approximately -94.05 cents
of the gender wage gap is attributed to worker characteristics. The negative sign
implies that women have the advantage in human capital accumulation, thus were
more qualied for promotion. This is consistent with BBJ prediction that women
would have more human capital than the men because women have higher cost hur-
dles that have to be overcome by more human capital investment. Given this result
we would expect to see women in higher positions in the absence of segregation. The
remaining wage di¤erence is accounted for by the statistical correction factor, which
adjusts for the di¤erence in predicted average wages and sample mean wages, and the
interaction e¤ect.
One must exercise caution when deciding whether to implement the decomposi-
tion under the homogenous worker assumption or under the assumption of worker
heterogeneity. The researcher can easily misspecify and misinterpret the results of
the decomposition when the details of the rm are unknown. This is apparent when
comparing results from Table 4 and 5 where we nd the decomposition segregation
e¤ect under the assumption of heterogenous workers to nearly double from the prior
case. Nonetheless the BBJ inspired model seems to accurately capture hierarchical
segregation as the dominant factor contributing to the gender wage gap.13
13If one were to assume that none of the institutional details about the wage structure of the rm
are known, then presumably one would follow BBJ and jointly estimate the segregation parameter
 and the separate returns on the Mincer variables for men and women. In examining this case
we encountered convergence issues that lead us to estimate the male and female log wage models
separately and infer the value of  = mf . The resulting decomposition took the form of equation (24)
and yielded a human capital accumulation e¤ect, a wage discrimination e¤ect, and a hierarchical
segregation e¤ect. This standard specication coupled with a model of hierarchical segregation
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The presence of non-overlapping job titles precludes a meaningful comparison be-
tween the BBJ inspired decomposition and a conventional decomposition. The BBJ
approach nesses the issue of non-overlapping job titles and is able to identify the hu-
man capital e¤ect apart from the segregation e¤ect, which is not the case when using
the conventional wage-level decomposition. To facilitate some empirical comparison
between the BBJ inspired model and the conventional model, we are able to take into
consideration the wage structure of the rm by constraining the parameters in the
conventional log wage equations to be the same for males and females.14 Our version
of the conventional log wage specication includes 13 job positions in addition to the
human capital variables. The estimated conventional log wage equation is reported
in Table 6.
A comparison between Tables 5 and 6 reveals that the occupational dummy vari-
ables greatly attenuate the estimated wage e¤ects of age and tenure compared with
the hierarchical segregation model. Clearly, much of the estimated returns to age and
tenure are masked by the job title indicator variables. These results reinforce the
advantages of using the BBJ inspired decompositions over the conventional decom-
position.
5.2 Applying Hierarchical Model to CPS Data
Finally, we validate our methodological contribution by applying the hierarchical
model to CPS data, which is commonly used by researchers in labor market analysis.
grossly misrepresented the actual wage structure and implied wage discrimination against men where
pure wage discrimination should not exist at all.
14Constraining the parameters in the conventional log wage equations to be the same for males
and females will result in a simple case of groupwise heteroskedasticity because the error variances
are di¤erent between men and women. Indeed the hierarchical segregation model predicts groupwise
heteroscedasticity. Thus, we weight the female observations by 1=bf and the male observations by
1=bm and estimate the parameters via FGLS.
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The goal is to determine whether there is a general take-away that extends beyond
what we have learned using the grocery store data. In particular, we compare the
decomposition results under the assumption that the wage structure is known to
the more typical case where the rms wage structure is unknown. We apply our
extension of the BBJ decomposition to a subset of the March 2011 CPS data set.
The sample is restricted to individuals who are members of a union or are paid union
wages. This allows us to assume that men and women are paid identically for the
same position within the hierarchy. Furthermore, we limit the sample to individuals
who earn positive wages and are employed in the same industry. This allows us
to avoid confounding the e¤ects of occupational/industry segregation and instead
estimate hierarchical discrimination. The public administration industry, aggregated
to the 2 digit level, was chosen due to the relatively large number of male (171) and
female (98) workers.
The mean hourly wages within this sample are 26.54 and 23.67 dollars for males
and females respectively resulting in an average wage gap of 2.87 dollars. The wage
specication includes education, potential experience, and its square.15 Given that
we limit our sample to union workers, it is reasonable to assume that overt wage
discrimination is nonexistent. Theoretically, we should not observe a discrimination
component in the decomposition. However if we do not constrain the models para-
meters to be the same between men and women, we obtain results consistent with
what we nd in our sample rm (see footnote 12), where there is not only a wage
discrimination component explaining the gender wage gap, but the magnitudes of
each component are implausibly large.16
If we move on to the alternate specication where we constrain the returns on
15We do not include education in our original specication because the workers at the grocery
store were homogenous with respect to education and we had their tenure within the rm. This is
not necessarily the case for the sample of workers in the CPS.
16The decomposition results from this case are available upon request.
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potential experience and on education to be the same for men and women, this will
result in the absence of a pure wage discrimination component in the decomposition
as shown in equation (25). Instead the gender wage gap will be attributed to some
combination of human capital di¤erences and hierarchical segregation. Table 7 pro-
vides the coe¢ cient estimates as well as the decomposition results associated with
equation (25). Our ndings indicate that the distributions of males and females are
not equalized across job titles given that the coe¢ cient of segregation, , is greater
than 1. The highest percentage of the gender wage gap is attributed to hierarchical
segregation, where 3.66 dollars of the 2.87 dollar wage gap is due to women being
excluded from higher paying job titles. Moreover, -52.43 cents of the gender wage gap
is attributed to worker characteristics. This is not surprising given that the negative
sign implies that women have the advantage in human capital accumulation, thus
were more qualied for promotion. The remaining wage di¤erence is explained by
the statistical correction factor, which adjusts for the di¤erence in predicted average
wages and sample mean wages, and the interaction e¤ect.
Interestingly, the results obtained using the CPS data are consistent with what we
learned from the single rm example. We nd in both cases that if the researcher
does not account for the non-discriminatory wage structure within job titles, the
segregation e¤ect is inated by at least a factor of 2. In both samples, the wage
discrimination e¤ect is estimated to be in favor of the male workers. As a result,
we would incorrectly interpret these ndings to suggest that women are paid more
then their male counterparts with identical characteristics within the same job title.17
Furthermore, all the components of the wage gap have implausibly large magnitudes.
17This result is not surprising. If hierarchical segregation exists, then it is probably the case
that women have higher education and experience levels, but are not being promoted. Thus in
the absence of insider knowledge of the wage structure, the decomposition from equation (24) will
incorrectly capture part of the segregation and endowment e¤ect in the discrimination component.
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Because the CPS data are not rm-level, we do not have information on specic job
titles which precludes a meaningful comparison between the BBJ inspired decompo-
sition and a conventional decomposition. Some researchers use occupation codes to
proxy job titles, however the choice and aggregation are arbitrary, making it di¢ -
cult to proxy a hierarchical structure. Again, the BBJ approach nesses this issue
as well as the issue of non-overlapping job titles and is able to identify the human
capital e¤ect apart from the segregation e¤ect, which is not the case when using the
conventional wage-level decomposition.
This exercise has allowed us to validate the use of the BBJ inspired decomposition
to estimate the e¤ect of job segregation on the gender wage gap as well as determine
the direction and magnitude of the bias that can result when using nationally repre-
sentative data where the wage structure is unknown. In general, if the wage structure
is known to the extent that there is some knowledge that overt wage discrimination is
nonexistent (i.e. union workers) we can constrain the model parameters and jointly
maximize the male and female likelihood functions to obtain the segregation parame-
ter and calculate the factors that contribute to the gender wage gap. If we do not
have knowledge regarding the wage structure of the rms that the individuals belong
to, then we at least have an idea of the direction of the bias.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper evaluates and extends existing methodologies used to estimate intra-
rm segregation on the gender wage gap. In particular, we provide an empirical
application of the BBJ theory of hierarchical discrimination using detailed payroll
data from a single rm. These data provide an opportunity to examine how standard
wage specications integrated with a model of hierarchical segregation might perform
in wage decompositions that seek to measure the contributions of endowments, pure
wage discrimination, and segregation.
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The advantage of using the BBJ model is that it establishes the relationship be-
tween occupational segregation and wage discrimination such that the e¤ects of oc-
cupational segregation can be identied without having to commit to a particular
job title aggregation. In our case because the job titles are quite detailed, the con-
ventional decompositions will result in the empty cell problem because of a lack of
complete overlap across job titles. There are job positions lled either solely by women
(males) and thus dropped from the male (female) regressions. In a conventional de-
composition with log wages and non overlapping occupational categories, the terms
corresponding to the non overlapping occupational variables confound identication
of the wage e¤ects of characteristics, discrimination, and segregation. This problem is
not resolved by converting the decompositions over to wage level gaps. When we ex-
tend the BBJ decomposition to allow for nonlinearities that arise from the assumed
wage distribution and include an interaction term that frees the segregation e¤ect
from being dependent on the factors that contribute to wage discrimination, we are
able to better identify the segregation e¤ect and determine the direction of the bias
that results from not knowing the wage structure.
This study nds that inferences about the role of pure wage discrimination (and
job segregation) in determining gender wage gaps can be greatly distorted by the
specication error that arises from imposing otherwise plausible models of gender
wage gaps. We validate the use of the hierarchical discrimination methodology by
applying our extension of the BBJ decomposition to CPS data. The results obtained
using the CPS data are consistent with what we nd from the grocery store data
in that if the researcher does not account for the non-discriminatory wage structure
within job titles, the segregation e¤ect is hugely inated and we misinterpret wage
discrimination against men when there is no wage discrimination at all.
We hope our research brings to light issues that arise when interpreting wage
decompositions in the usual setting in which the wage structure is unknown. Further
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research is necessary to nd more exible wage specications in situations where
the true wage structure of the rm is unknown by the researcher. We believe that
most unionized (or even non-union) rm level data will not follow any conventional
distribution, therefore a non-parametric route may be more informative. It is more
di¢ cult to substantiate a claim of discriminatory practices against a rm if prima
facie evidence shows that they employ the same wage structure within a given job
title irrespective of gender.
Our ndings suggest that even though we believe that our data are better suited to
evaluate the hierarchical model developed by BBJ and our extensions of the model,
we remain cautious about our inferences. However we are able to provide a lower
bound on the degree of bias that results when using household survey data. Fur-
ther exploration with other wage distributions and other rm data is in order before
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Hourly Wage 3.30 3.14






Hourly Wage 8.42 8.23






Hourly Wage 9.55 10.47






Hourly Wage — 10.80






Hourly Wage 9.53 —






Hourly Wage 8.75 9.05






Hourly Wage 6.47 6.25






Hourly Wage 7.65 8.28






Hourly Wage — 9.25






Hourly Wage — —






Hourly Wage — —






Hourly Wage 6.98 —
Weekly Salary — —
Earnings 12108.52 —
Table 1
Characterisitcs of Job Holders, 1981
Mean
Hierarchy Level Percentage Male Percentage Female Fraction of all Men Fraction of all Women Relative Proportion
h1 52.6 47.4 0.138 0.185 1.345
h2 52.5 47.5 0.596 0.803 1.348
h3 98.1 1.9 0.132 0.004 0.029
h4 94.6 5.4 0.045 0.004 0.084
h5 94.3 5.7 0.042 0.004 0.090
h6 100 0 0.047 0.000 0.000
h1 = Courtesy Clerk and Meat Wrapper
h2 = Variety Clerk, Food Clerk, Produce Clerk, Meat Cutter, and Other
h3 = Night Crew Chief, Produce Manager, and Meat Manager
h4 = Relief Manager
h5 = Assistant Manager
h6 = Store Manager
Table 2: Distribution of Men and Women across Job Hierarchy, 1981
Variable I II III IV
constant 2.075 0.223 0.632 1.357
[0.011]*** [0.051]*** [0.033]*** [0.012]***
female -0.044 -0.134 -0.067 -0.019
[0.018]** [0.012]*** [0.009]*** [0.011]*
tenure — 0.047 0.028 —
[0.003]*** [0.002]***
ten2 — -0.001 -0.001 —
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
age — 0.094 0.044 —
[0.003]*** [0.002]***
age2 — -0.001 -0.001 —
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
food_clerk81 — — 0.585 0.764
[0.012]*** [0.014]***
night_stocking_manager81 — — 0.628 0.845
[0.025]*** [0.031]***
produce_clerk81 — — 0.579 0.738
[0.018]*** [0.023]***
meat_manager81 — — 0.665 1.023
[0.025]*** [0.030]***
meat_cutter81 — — 0.734 0.989
[0.018]*** [0.020]***
meat_wrapper81 — — 0.682 0.917
[0.023]*** [0.028]***
variety_clerk81 — — 0.424 0.598
[0.023]*** [0.029]***
other81 — — 0.327 0.467
[0.038]*** [0.049]***
store_manager81 — — 0.971 1.328
[0.025]*** [0.030]***
asst_manager81 — — 0.828 1.14
[0.025]*** [0.030]***
relief_manager81 — — 0.81 1.025
[0.024]*** [0.030]***
courtesy_clerk left out reference group
N 1968 1968 1968 1968
R-Squared 0.0031 0.5635 0.8333 0.7214
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3: Log Hourly Wage Regressions (OLS), 1981
µ = 2.08 Decomposition Wage Difference Percent Difference
[0.110]***
σ = 0.3783 Segregation 0.7081 1.0674
[0.0058]***
γ = 1.0945 Non-linear -0.0447 -0.0674
[0.0088]***
N = 1968 Total 0.6628 1









based off of joint estimation of the male and female likelihood functions










Table 5: Heterogenous Lognormal Regression-No Discrimination
Grocery Store Sample


















































Standard errors in brackets
Table 6: Lognormal Regressions with Job Title Indicators
Hourly Wage








based off of joint estimation of the male and female likelihood functions













Table 7: Heterogenous Lognormal Regression-No Discrimination
CPS Sample
Pooled Men and Women
1.6531
Appendix: The Gamma Distribution
In this appendix present the gender wage decompositions in the hierarchical model









where wages represent a continuum of jobs. As in the case of the log normal distri-
bution, in this example from the class of exponential distributions the female wage
density gf (w) is obtained from the discriminatory sorting function s (w) and the male











Consequently, the female wage density gf (w) follows the gamma distribution:
1






























where  is a parameter that represents the rate of decline of the proportion of females













< 0 and lim
!1
gf (w) = gm(w): Conceptually, it is preferable to
introduce the normalization  =  1  0 so that the absence of segregation implies
 = 0.
We rst consider the special case in which wages within each job title are xed
and workers are homogenous. With no di¤erences in characteristics other than sex,
and wages being equalized within each job category, the decomposition reduces to a
segregation term. The expected wage di¤erence between males and females is given
by
E(wm)  E(wf ) = (p)  (p)







  + 1

: (3)
One would operationalize the model by using the MLE parameter estimates obtained
from the combined samples of males and females, and by taking account of deviations
2
between sample means and predicted sample means:




 ^^ + 1
!
+ ^f











where bm and bf are remainder terms that equate the means of the predicted wages
for males and females to their sample means. The rst term in (4) is the empirical
estimate of the gender wage gap e¤ects of segregation, and the second term captures
the sample mean wage di¤erence due to gender di¤erences in the deviation between
sample mean wages and predicted mean wages.
In order to accommodate worker heterogeneity, we follow BBJ in replacing the scale





















Conditioning on worker characteristics (x) introduces additional parameters (), where
m = exp(xmm) and f = exp(xff )
1. With worker heterogeneity the presence of
wage discrimination implies that female wage rates within each job title z are a frac-
tion () of the wage rates the females would face if their characteristics were valued
1We depart from BBJ by specifying the scale parameter functions as exponential functions of
covariates rather than as linear functions. We nd that using exponential link functions as opposed
to linear link functions has better convergence properties for our work.
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at the male returns. Worker heterogeneity and wage discrimination imply
E (z) = () (p)
 
0f
 0f + 1
!
; (7)
where 0f = exp(xfm). The female wage density (6) implies
E (z) = (p)

f
 f + 1

: (8)




 f + 1





Clearly in the absence of wage discrimination, m  f = 0) f = 0f )  = 1. One
can maximize the likelihood function for the combined sample of males and females
with respect to the parameters m; f ,  ;and p:
The expected wage gap between a representative male and a representative female
at the respective sample mean characteristics can be written as
E(wmjxm)  E(wf jxf ) = (p)(m)  (p)
 
f
 f + 1
!
where m = exp(xmm) and f = exp(xff ): After some algebraic manipulation, the
expected wage gap can be decomposed according to
E(wmjxm)  E(wf jxf ) = (p)(m   0f ) + (p)(0f   f ) + (p)(f )
 
 f
 f + 1
!
(10)
where 0f = exp(xfm):The three RHS terms in (10) respectively correspond to the
individual characteristics, wage discrimination, and segregation e¤ects.
One might take issue with the fact that the discrimination measure depends on
the characteristics of the female sample and the segregation measure depends on the
extent of discrimination against women as well as on the characteristics of the female
sample. Analogous to the interaction terms used in decompositions to address this
4
issue, we add and subtract the terms (p)(m  mf ) and (p)(m)

 m
 m + 1

, where
mf = exp(xmf ): The resulting decomposition is given by
E(wmjxm)  E(wf jxf ) = (p)(m   0f ) + (p)(m   mf ) + (p)(m)

 m


















 m + 1
!#)
: (11)
The rst three terms in (11) correspond to the individual characteristics, wage dis-
crimination, and segregation e¤ects, while the fourth term reects the combination
of di¤erences in characteristics and parameters.
Since the decomposition described by (11) is evaluated at the sample mean char-
acteristics, we note that wage level decompositions based on the gamma distribution
do not in general correspond to the di¤erence in the average of individual conditional
mean wages. Consequently, our extension of the BBJ decomposition in this case in-
volves expressions for the sample means of the estimated individual decomposition













w^fi ; w^fi = p^
 
^fi
 ^^fi + 1
!



















w^mfi ; w^mfi = p^^mfi; ^mfi = exp(xmi^f );










 ^^mi + 1
1CA ;
Again we let bm = wm   w^m and bf = wf   w^f be the remainder terms that equate
5
the means of the predicted wages for males and females to their sample means. Our
decomposition of the sample mean di¤erence in wage levels is compactly expressed as




+ (w^m   w^mf ) + (w^ m) +
bm   bf (12)
+
 
w^0f   w^m + w^mf   w^ m   w^f

:
The rst four terms on the RHS of (12) respectively correspond to endowment e¤ects,
wage discrimination, segregation e¤ects, and the e¤ects gender di¤erences between
sample mean wages and predicted mean wages. The fth term residually reects the
interaction e¤ects between endowments, discrimination, and segregation.
In the absence of pure wage discrimination, such as in the presence of gender neutral
union wage contracts, one would impose the restriction m = f =  in the likelihood
function. Accordingly the decomposition simplies to



























~wfi ; ~wfi = ~p
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fi + 1
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~ ~mi + 1
1CA ;
~m = wm   ~wm and ~f = wf   ~wf .
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